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Abstract 
 To engineer secure software, it is imperative to understand attackers’ perspectives and 
approaches. This information has been captured by attack patterns. The Common Attack Patterns 
Enumeration Classification (CAPEC) repository hosts over 450 attack patterns that contain 
information about how attacks have been launched against software. Researches have indicated 
that attack patterns can be utilized for developing secure software; however, there exists no 
systematic methodology to address this concern. This research proposes a methodology for 
utilizing CAPEC attack patterns for developing abuse cases at the requirements stage of the 
secure software development lifecycle (SDLC). In previous research, a tool for retrieving attack 
patterns (TrAP) was developed to retrieve CAPEC attack patterns according to Microsoft 
STRIDE threat categories. This tool also features a search function using keywords. The 
proposed methodology starts with a set of initial abuse cases developed through brainstorming. 
Microsoft SDL threat modelling tool is then used to identify and rank possible security threats in 
the system. The SDL tool generates a series of questions for each threat and these questions are 
used to extract keywords that serve as input to the TrAP tool to retrieve attack patterns relevant 
to the abuse cases. Keywords can also be system prerequisites or any technology being 
implemented in the system. From the list of retrieved attack patterns, the most relevant attack 
patterns are selected and used to extend the initial abuse cases. New abuse cases can also be 
discovered through this process.  
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CHAPTER 1 
Introduction 
 To improve the security of computer systems, information, and the cyber space, it is 
critical to engineer more secure software. Research has shown that the majority of the security 
defects are due to known software defects. To develop secure and reliable software, software 
developers must anticipate abnormal behavior. Therefore, software developers need to have the 
mindset of an attacker (McGraw, 2006). Attack patterns are valuable resources to help software 
developers to think like an attacker. Attack patterns capture attackers’ perspectives and 
approaches used by attackers to exploit software.  They are valuable resources to help software 
developers to think like an attacker and have the potential to be used in each phase of the secure 
software development life cycle. However, systematic processes or methods for utilizing existing 
attack pattern resources for secure software development are needed. 
 The Common Attack Pattern Enumeration and Classification (CAPEC) initiative 
sponsored by the Department of Homeland Security and maintained by Cigital hosts over 450 
attack patterns along with a comprehensive schema and classification taxonomy. CAPEC 
however, is not easy to use, since users have to go through the whole list to get the attack pattern 
they are looking for. This does not make using CAPEC for software development attractive to 
developers. In our quest to improve the usability of the CAPEC library and make it more user 
friendly, we proposed a methodology to utilize CAPEC to develop abuse cases. 
 This research describes our methodology of utilizing attack patterns for extending abuse 
cases. Pauli & Xu (2005) described a use/misuse case model for Hospital Information System 
(HIS) in their paper. We would extend their misuse cases using our approach. The most relevant 
3 
 
 
attack patterns retrieved by the tool for retrieving CAPEC attack patterns would be further 
refined and used for extending the abuse cases.  
 This methodology is utilized to develop abuse cases for a Hospital Information System 
(HIS) described in (Pauli & Xu, 2005). Our case study demonstrates that the proposed 
methodology could be used to select attack patterns to extend a set of initial abuse cases 
generated through brainstorming and discover new abuse cases. 
 The rest of the thesis is organized as follows: Chapter 2 provides a literature review on 
attack patterns and use and abuse cases, and also introduces Microsoft SDL threat modelling tool 
and the tool for retrieving attack patterns (TrAP). Chapter 3 discusses the proposed methodology 
for utilizing attack patterns to develop abuse cases. Chapter 4 describes how our proposed 
methodology is used for developing abuse cases for HIS. Lastly, chapter 5 concludes the thesis 
and raises concern for future work. 
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CHAPTER 2  
Literature Review 
 This chapter introduces the concept of attack patterns and how they are applied to secure 
software development from various researchers point of view. The chapter also briefly 
introduces the concept of use and abuse cases. Microsoft SDL threat modelling tool and the tool 
for retrieving attack patterns (TrAP) are also introduced in this chapter. 
2.1 Attack Patterns 
 Attack patterns generalize attacks employed by attackers on software systems. Though a 
relatively new concept, attack patterns has received significant research attention in recent times 
(Moore, Ellison, & Linger, 2001). Sethi and Barnum (2006) also illustrated that attack patterns 
have the potential to be used in each phase of the SDLC, including requirement gathering, 
architecture and design, implementation and coding, as well as testing. A number of researches 
that have focused on attack patterns and how they are related to this work are discussed below. 
 Hoglund and McGraw (2004) described 49 attack patterns in their book “Exploiting 
Software: How to Break Code”. Sponsored by the Department of Homeland Security, the 
ongoing Common Attack Pattern Enumeration and Classification (CAPEC) initiative collects a 
set of publicly available core attack patterns along with a comprehensive schema and 
classification taxonomy.  Currently CAPEC includes over 450 attack patterns contributed by the 
community. 
 Sethi and Barnum (2006) illustrated using examples how attack patterns can be utilized in 
each phase of the SDLC, a systematic process or method of utilizing existing attack patterns to 
develop secure software is lacking. There is little research on how to use attack patterns such as 
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CAPEC in the secure software development life cycle. Towards utilizing CAPEC information 
for secure software development. 
 Pauli and Engebretson (2008a) proposed a prototype tool that retrieves related CAPEC 
attack patterns based on system prerequisites user inputs to the tool. The attack patterns and 
mitigation strategies for the attack patterns presented to the user can be used during system 
design and implementation. The prerequisites include hardware, operating system, server 
configuration and programming language. 
 Gegick and Williams (2005) constructed 53 attack patterns that can be used for 
identifying security vulnerabilities during software design. These attack patterns were developed 
based on four existing vulnerability databases. These attack patterns were represented using 
regular expressions to encapsulate the steps that can be used to attack the software application. 
These attack patterns were used to identify vulnerabilities via matching a sequence of elements 
in a system design that permits the sequence of events in the attack pattern to occur. They used 
attack patterns to identify security vulnerabilities, we map CAPEC attack patterns to STRIDE 
(Spoofing, Tampering, Repudiation, Information Disclosure, Denial of Service, Elevation of 
Privilege) to develop abuse cases. 
 Pauli and Engebretson (2008b) developed an approach for teaching attack patterns based 
on a hierarchy to present information logically. This hierarchy includes the following levels of 
abstraction from highest to lowest: vulnerability, attack pattern, exploit, bug and flaw, activation 
zone, injection vector, payload, and reward. Students were asked to map CAPEC Release 1 to 
the abstraction levels of this hierarchy. The objective of this work is to assist students to learn 
and retain information on attack patterns through the mapping process. They mapped attack 
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patterns to abstraction level for teaching, we mapped attack patterns to STRIDE to retrieve 
relevant attack patterns from CAPEC to develop abuse case. 
 Barnum and Sethi (2007) give a general overview of the structure and content of attack 
patterns and explain how they can be applied in each stage of the secure software development 
lifecycle. They explained in detail the concept of CAPEC attack patterns with examples to show 
their usage as well. 
 Wiesauer and Sametinger (2009) developed a taxonomy for security design patterns 
using attack patterns. In their taxonomy, they described a criteria for selecting attack patterns 
based on security requirements. The purpose of the taxonomy was to help users see relevant 
security design patterns when selecting attack patterns. Their work assigned security design 
patterns to CAPEC attack patterns and employs the STRIDE model to group attacks into 
different categories to classify security patterns, while our work maps CAPEC attack patterns to 
STRIDE for developing abuse cases. 
 McGraw (2006) mentioned in his book that attack patterns can be used for developing 
abuse cases, however, he did not discuss an approach to select and use relevant attack patterns 
for developing abuse cases. Our work introduces an approach for selecting and utilizing CAPEC 
attack patterns for developing abuse cases. 
2.2 Use and Abuse/Misuse Cases 
 Use case is a functional description of how a user might interact with a system. 
McDermott & Fox (1999) classifies it as an abstract episode of interaction between a system and 
its environment. Use cases are represented by UML diagrams and their descriptions. It tells what 
the system is intended to be used for, thereby leveraging functional requirements. They describe 
the system’s behavior under normal expected use conditions. However, when the system is used 
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in an inappropriate way (abused), we need to have an idea of how the system may behave. This 
introduces the concept of abuse/misuse cases. 
 Misuse case is a use case from an attacker perspective with the intent to harm the system 
(Alexander, 2003). A misuse case might harm an actor of the system, a stakeholder or the system 
itself (McDermott, & Fox, 1999). Misuse cases threaten use cases, it is considered as the 
opposite form of a use case. Abuse cases serve as a support for developers and elicits security 
requirements. Countermeasures are developed to mitigate misuse cases in the form of security 
use cases (Tndel, et al. 2010) Some authors maintain a stand that abuse cases and misuse cases 
are different. In this research however, abuse cases and misuse cases will be used 
interchangeably and carry the same meaning. 
 Hope, McGraw & Anton (2004) stated informed brainstorming as the simplest, most 
practical method for creating abuse cases. 
 McGraw (2006) discussed a process for developing abuse cases. It takes into account, a 
set of requirements and standard use cases, and a list of attack patterns. This research focuses on 
how to find relevant attack patterns from CAPEC, and how to use these attack patterns to extend 
abuse cases and discover new abuse cases. 
2.3 Microsoft SDL Threat Modelling  
 Software architectural risk analysis refers to the activity of identifying and ranking risks 
applied to architecture and design-level artifacts. One risk analysis methodology is Microsoft’s 
threat modeling (Meier et al. 2003; Hernan, et al. 2006). It is the process of hypothesizing 
potential security threats, evaluating the threats, ranking the threats and suggesting mitigation 
strategies. It includes the following steps: (1) Identify assets; (2) Create an architecture overview; 
(3) Decompose the application; (4) Identify, document, and rate the threats. Threats are classified 
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into six categories: Spoofing, Tampering, Repudiation, Information disclosure, Denial of service, 
and Elevation of privilege (STRIDE). Threats are ranked based on their Damage potential, 
Reproducibility, Exploitability, Affected users, and Discoverability (DREAD) (Meier et al. 
2003; Hernan, et al. 2006). 
 Microsoft Security Development Lifecycle Threat Modeling Tool 3.1.8 is a free tool for 
software developers and architects to identify possible security threats and mitigate potential 
security risks. It is based on the Microsoft STRIDE framework. The tool requires architectural 
information to develop data flow diagrams (DFD) and has the ability to analyze model, describe 
environment and generate several reports. The steps of using Microsoft SDL threat modeling tool 
3.1.8 are described below: 
(1) Draw data flow diagram. The software system needs to first be decomposed into relevant 
elements. Each element is analyzed for susceptibility to the threats. Data flow diagrams (DFDs) 
are used to represent the decomposition of the system. Figure 1 shows an example DFD diagram 
that the MSDL tool presents to users when the tool is ran. The DFDs comprises of the following 
elements in relation to the elements of a system: data flows, data stores, processes, external 
interactors, and trust boundaries (Hernan, et al. 2006). 
User
Commands
Responses
Configuration
Results
My Process Data
 
Figure 1. An Example Data Flow Diagram (DFD) 
 Data flows are represented by arrows and connect interactors, processes and data stores to 
each other to show how data flows between the elements of the system. The data flows in figure 
1 are “Commands”, “Responses”, “Configuration” and “Results”. 
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 Data stores represent storage repositories where data is stored in the system. They are 
represented by two parallel lines with the name of the data store in-between the lines. In figure 1, 
the data store is “Data”. 
 Processes are represented by circles in the DFD diagram. They represent some kind of 
data processing or system configurations are done. The process in figure 1 is My Process. It takes 
commands from the User and saves configuration to the Data. 
 External interactors are human users or non-human actors such as computers. They are 
outside the system and interact in various ways with the system. They might have to cross certain 
boundaries to interact with the system. They are represented by rectangular box. User is the 
external interactor in figure 1. The commands coming from User cross a trust boundary 
represented by a red dotted arc. 
 The system may comprise of one or more of the following boundaries: trust, machine, 
process or other boundaries. These boundaries represent authentication and/or authorization and 
may restrict access to certain areas in the system without authentication or certain resources 
without authorization or both. 
(2) Analyze model. This step of the Microsoft Threat Modeling process presents all the threat 
types associated with all the elements of the DFD model to the developer. The elements refer to 
the data flows, the processes, data store and interactors. For each element and for each threat 
type to the element, the developer needs to consider a series of questions presented by the tool 
and describe the threat impact and how to mitigate the threat. Table 1 illustrates a summary of 
the threats that affect the various elements of the DFD.  
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Table 1 
Threats Affecting Elements (Hernan et al, 2006) 
Element Spoofing Tampering Repudiation 
Information 
Disclosure 
Denial of 
Service 
Elevation of 
Privilege 
Data Flows (DF)  X  X X  
Data Stores (DS)  X  X X  
Processes (P) X X X X X X 
Interactors (I) X  X    
 
(3) Describe environment. During this step, the developers note elements that the system is 
linked to, especially third-party code, as well as assumptions made by the developers. The 
developers also describe external security notes and document header information. 
(4) Generate reports. This step generates several reports for the developer, such as “Bug Report”, 
“Recommended Fuzzing”, “Analysis Report”, “Threat Model Report”, etc. 
2.4 A Tool for Retrieving Attack Patterns (TrAP) 
 A tool for categorizing attack patterns based on Microsoft STRIDE framework was 
developed by mapping attack patterns to STRIDE categories. Various textual values of 
properties such as Severity, Completeness, Attacker Skills, Likelihood of Exploit and etc. were 
converted to numerical values to calculate a metric for each attack pattern. The textual values 
were in the form of high to low or very high to very low rankings. The conversions were as 
follows: high in a textual context was converted to 3 in the numerical context, medium to 2, and 
low to 1. Similarly, very high was converted to 5 and very low to 1. The tool calculates a metric 
from these values and uses it to rank each attack pattern according to each particular STRIDE 
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category. This ranking puts the attack patterns most relevant to a particular STRIDE category at 
the top of the list of retrieved patterns. 
 TrAP is implemented in PHP and MySQL and is web-based for easy access (Figure 2 
shows the interface of TrAP displaying retrieved attack patterns under the spoofing category). 
TrAP is currently running on a localhost server and would be deployed soon to the internet. The 
retrieved attack patterns are ranked from most relevant to least relevant under each STRIDE 
category (Yuan et al., 2014).  
 
Figure 2. Interface of TrAP Showing Attack Patterns Retrieved under Spoofing Threat 
 TrAP also features a keyword search that allows easy access to attack patterns containing 
these type of words. The radio buttons in figure 2 are used to toggle between how a user would 
like to search for patterns, either from the whole database or from a particular STRIDE type.  
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Figure 3 shows the result of searching for attack patterns in TrAP using the keyword “session” 
under the Spoofing threat category. 
 
Figure 3. Using Keyword “session” to Retrieve Attack Patterns in TrAP 
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CHAPTER 3 
The Methodology for Using CAPEC Attack Patterns to Develop Abuse Cases 
 This chapter introduces our methodology for using CAPEC attack patterns to develop 
abuse cases. The approach uses SDL threat modelling to assist in retrieving CAPEC attack 
patterns most relevant to the system. These attack patterns are then used to extend a set of initial 
abuse cases and discover new abuse cases. We use an example to illustrate the steps of this 
methodology. 
3.1 Methodology of Developing Abuse Cases Using CAPEC Attack Patterns 
 Figure 4 below describes the methodology of developing abuse cases using attack 
patterns. Developers develop use cases and brainstorm abuse cases from the use cases 
considering the behaviors of the users. Microsoft SDL threat modeling process is followed to 
decompose the system architecture into elements and analyze each element for threats. This 
process generates questions based on threat type per element. Keywords are extracted from the 
questions generated to search for attack patterns using the tool for retrieving attack patterns 
(TrAP). Keywords are also generated from the system architecture documentation considering 
any technology being implemented in the system. Scanning through the list of attack patterns 
generated by TrAP according to STRIDE should also be considered to select relevant attack 
patterns that may be missed by keywords search. The retrieved attack patterns are then used to 
extend the initially brainstormed abuse cases in and can sometimes introduce new abuse cases 
that should be considered for the system. 
14 
 
 
Develop Use 
Cases
Use Cases
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2
1
Run MSDL Tool
Run Attack Pattern 
Tool (TrAP)
Architecture 
components and 
Questions 
Generated by 
Threat Type
5
3
Attack Patterns 5
System 
Architecture and 
Design Documents 3
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Input Activity Output
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Cases, Find new 
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6
Generate 
Keywords
4
4
List of Keywords
4
5
Requirements Team
1
2
Figure 4. The Methodology for Developing Abuse Cases Using Attack Patterns 
 The detailed process depicted in Figure 4 is described below: The numbering in Figure 4 
is in correspondence with the order of activity flow. 
1. System architecture information is collected and used to develop use cases. 
2. The system architecture information and the developed use cases are used in a brainstorming 
process to develop initial abuse cases. 
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3. The Microsoft SDL threat modelling tool is then ran to analyze threats that pertain to the 
various elements of the system. This is done by first developing a DFD (data flow diagram) 
from the system architecture and design documents. The elements of the system are external 
interactors, processes, data flows and data stores. This process constitutes the architectural 
risk analysis of the system and the output is a list of threats that pertain to the system 
elements. The threat types are Spoofing, Tampering, Repudiation, Information Disclosure, 
Denial of Service, and Elevation of Privilege (STRIDE). The tool generates questions about 
each threat type for each element of the system. These questions are used to extract keywords 
for searching attack patterns in TrAP. The elements implement the use cases, which means 
the elements have a direct relationship with the use cases and a corresponding relationship 
with the abuse cases that threaten the use cases. 
4. Keywords are extracted from the questions generated by the SDL tool and system 
architecture documentation. 
5. These keywords are used to search attack patterns in the Tool for Retrieving Attack Patterns 
(TrAP) to select most relevant attack patterns by STRIDE category.  
6. The selected attack patterns are used to extend the initially brainstormed abuse cases. The 
retrieved attack patterns are ranked in order of relevance by the TrAP tool. Information used 
for extending abuse cases is extracted from the “Description” and/or “Example Instance” 
section of the attack pattern. The result of this exercise is a document of extended abuse 
cases for the system under development. If there are too many abuse cases, remove the ones 
with: 1.) Low likelihood of exploit, severity, attacker skills; 2.) Obsolete technology as attack 
prerequisites and required resources; 3.) High attacker skills and knowledge required. 
Document any new abuse cases that may be discovered during the process. 
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 The “Solutions and Mitigations” section of the attack patterns in conjunction with the 
mitigations provided by the threat model analysis can be used to suggest a strong mitigation 
strategy for the system. However mitigation strategies are out of scope of this research. 
3.2 Illustrating the Methodology with an Example 
 In this section, we use an example Health Information System (HIS) based on work done 
by Pauli & Xu (2005). In their paper, Pauli & Xu (2005) suggested an approach for design and 
analysis of secure software systems based on use and misuse cases. They illustrated their 
approach by performing a case study on a security-intensive hospital information system. We 
will adopt their hospital information system as an example to illustrate our methodology. For the 
purpose of clarification, we simplify the use and abuse case model of their example HIS. 
 The following sections introduce using the steps presented in Figure 4 to illustrate how to 
develop abuse cases. 
 3.2.1 Use Cases for Doctor. The HIS has many users which may include secretaries, 
nurses, doctors, pharmacists, IT personnel, business office personnel and administrative 
personnel (Pauli & Xu 2005).  These user have certain behaviors or interactions closely related to 
the HIS security: 1) Secretary entering patient information; 2) Nurse entering preliminary 
appointment information; 3) Doctor entering appointment findings; 4) Doctor transmitting 
pharmacy orders to the pharmacy; 5) Pharmacist receiving pharmacy order. For the purpose of 
this work, we consider only the doctor’s role of entering appointment findings which depends on 
the nurse’s role of entering preliminary appointment information. 
 The users are given enough permissions to access data they need to execute their job or 
parts of the system. The doctor is assigned the following tasks in HIS: 1) patient diagnoses; 2) 
treatment prescription; 3) documenting details of the appointment findings into the HIS after the 
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completion of an appointment; 4) entering pharmacy orders to be transmitted to the pharmacy; 
and 5) setting the access levels for the nurses and secretaries. For the purpose of illustrating our 
methodology, we select one use case based on which abuse cases are developed. 
“Enter Appointment Findings” Use Case Description. The doctor logs in to HIS server 
using a secure browser. The server authenticates the Doctor and opens a session for him. The 
Doctor enters patient appointment findings and transmits pharmacy orders to the pharmacy, and 
then logs out.  
 Abuse/misuse cases could be developed based on the interactions described in the above 
description. 
 3.2.2 Abuse Cases for Doctor. An attacker may abuse HIS by changing the doctor’s 
appointment findings. The attacker might do so by impersonating the doctor or by intercepting 
data packets and analyzing them for further attacks. Figure 5 below shows the use-misuse case 
model for the doctor. Use cases are represented by white ovals, black ovals represent abuse 
cases.  
 3.2.3 Threat Modelling. Microsoft SDL tool is used for performing threat modelling 
analysis to find threats pertaining to elements of a system. The system is decomposed into 
elements to develop a data flow diagram (DFD). The elements are external interactors, data 
flows, processes, and data stores. Figure 6 represents the DFD diagram of HIS. The diagram 
depicts interactions between the doctor and the HIS system. 
18 
 
 
Doctor
 
Enter 
Appointment 
Findings
Hacker
 
Change 
Doctor’s 
Findings
 
Intercept and 
Analyze Packets
 
Impersonate 
Doctor
Includes
Threatens
Includes
 
Figure 5. Doctor use & misuse case model in HIS 
Doctor (D)
Findings (F) Findings Data 
(FD)
View (V)
Update (U)
Enter (E)
Retrieve (R)
 
Figure 6. Data Flow Diagram (DFD) for HIS 
 In Figure 6, the doctor has the ability to enter or retrieve appointment findings after he is 
successfully authenticated and authorized (red dashed line represents authentication and 
authorization) by the system. The Findings process takes the data from doctor, processes it and 
sends to the findings data store. The arrows show the data flow between the doctor, the Findings 
process and the data store. 
 Figure 7 shows the interface of the SDL tool where the threats are generated for each 
element. The “Analyze Model” stage of the SDL generates threats accompanied by questions 
that address it each threat. The same threats pertains to elements of the same type (as 
summarized by Table 1 in section 2.3).  
 Figure 8 is a closer look at the questions posed by the tool for the Spoofing threat under 
the Findings element. 
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Figure 7. MSDL Interface Showing Threats and Questions Generated By Tool for Each Threat 
 
Figure 8. Closer Look at Questions Generated by MSDL Threat Modeling Tool for Spoofing 
Threat of the Findings Process. 
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 3.2.4 Generate Keywords. The questions presented by the SDL tool serve as a useful 
resource for extracting keywords used to search for most relevant CAPEC attack patterns.  The 
keywords may range from words to phrases based on the developer’s discretion. These extracted 
keywords are input to the Tool for Retrieving Attack Patterns (TrAP) to search for attack 
patterns related to the security concern the Microsoft SDL tool tries to address. The most related 
attack patterns would be used in extending the abuse cases. 
 For our example, the keywords extracted from figure 8 include: spoofing, credentials, 
key, cryptography, password, and authentication.  
 3.2.5 Searching Relevant Attack Patterns using the Tool for Retrieving Attack 
Patterns (TrAP). TrAP retrieves the most relevant attack patterns from highest to lowest 
rankings by STRIDE (Spoofing, Tampering, Repudiation, Information Disclosure, Denial of 
Service and Elevation of Privilege) category.  
 Each keyword found from threat modeling was input in the TrAP tool to retrieve a set of 
CAPEC attack patterns. We combine all the attack patterned retrieved from all the keywords, 
eliminating duplicates and less relevant ones (those with little or no detailed information). For 
our example, the resulting attack patterns are listed in Table 2. 
Table 2 
List of Selected Attack Patterns for Spoofing Findings Process using Keywords generated by 
SDL Tool 
CAPEC 
ID 
Attack Pattern Name 
21 Exploitation of Session Variables; Resource IDs and other Trusted Credentials 
60 Reusing Session IDs (aka Session Replay) 
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Table 2 
Cont. 
59 Session Credential Falsification through Prediction 
37 Lifting Data Embedded in Client Distributions 
196 Session Credential Falsification through Forging 
98 Phishing 
107 Cross Site Tracing 
57 Utilizing REST's Trust in the System Resource to Register Man in the Middle 
205 
Lifting credential(s)/key material embedded in client distributions (thick or 
thin) 
90 Reflection Attack in Authentication Protocol 
70 Try Common(default) Usernames and Passwords 
199 Cross-Site Scripting Using Alternate Syntax 
69 Target Programs with Elevated Privileges 
68 Subvert Code-signing Facilities 
97 Cryptanalysis 
112 Brute Force 
49 Password Brute Forcing 
55 Rainbow Table Password Cracking 
16 Dictionary-based Password Attack 
50 Password Recovery Exploitation 
57 Utilizing REST's Trust in the System Resource to Register Man in the Middle 
114 Authentication Abuse 
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Table 2 
Cont. 
11 Cause Web Server Misclassification 
136 LDAP Injection 
83 XPath Injection 
39 Manipulating Opaque Client-based Data Tokens 
22 Exploiting Trust in Client (aka Make the Client Invisible) 
207 Removing Important Functionality from the Client 
5 Analog In-band Switching Signals (aka Blue Boxing) 
 
 3.2.6 Selecting Attack Patterns for extending an Abuse Case. In this section, attack 
patterns that are relevant to an abuse case are selected from the list in Table 2. At this point the 
table contains attack patterns that are relevant to the specific category of threat, however, the 
following points needs to be considered in order to select relevant attack patterns for developing 
a specific abuse case: 
1. The motivation of the attack pattern should be similar or match the objective of the abuse 
case. 
2. Any technology implemented by the software should be compared with the prerequisites of 
the attack pattern to ensure the right attack pattern is selected for developing abuse case for 
that technology. 
3. The resources required by the attack pattern should be compared with the resources required 
by the abuse case to ensure that the resources required by the attack patterns are not obsolete 
compared to that required by the abuse case. 
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4. Attacker skills, likelihood of exploit and severity of the attack pattern should be taken into 
consideration to determine whether it is suitable for developing abuse case. 
 For example, for the abuse case “Impersonate Doctor”, we select the following attack 
patterns: “CAPEC-21 Exploitation of Session Variables, Resource IDs and other Trusted 
Credentials”, “CAPEC-60: Reusing Session IDs (aka Session Replay)”, “CAPEC 59: Session 
Credential Falsification through Prediction” and “CAPEC-196: Session Credential Falsification 
through Forging”. 
 3.2.7 Extending Abuse Cases using selected attack patterns. The selected attack 
pattern could be used to extend the abuse case “Impersonate Doctor”.  We describe how the 
attack pattern “CAPEC-21: Exploitation of Session Variables, Resource IDs and other Trusted 
Credentials” is used to extend the abuse case below: 
 Information displayed in listings 1.1 through 1.3 are excerpts from the attack pattern that 
are used for developing the abuse case. Detailed information of the attack pattern can be found 
at: http://capec.mitre.org/data/definitions/21.html. 
1. Objective: To impersonate the doctor and change appointment findings. 
 Listing 1.1 is an excerpt from the attack pattern and gives a brief idea about the attack 
pattern and what it is used for. This listing summarizes the attack pattern and contains 
information for crafting the objective of the abuse case in consideration. 
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Listing 1.1. Snippet of the Attack Pattern showing the “Description” field for Crafting 
Abuse Case Objective. 
 Listing 1.2 contains information for creating the following sections of the abuse case. 
They may be directly transferred from the attack pattern. 
2. Prerequisites: Server software must rely on weak session IDs proof and/or verification 
schemes 
3. Resource Required: Ability to deploy software on network. Ability to communicate 
synchronously or asynchronously with server.  
4. Typical Severity: High 
5. Likelihood of Exploit: High 
6. Attacker Skills Level: Low 
 CAPEC-21: Exploitation of Session Variables, Resource IDs and other Trusted 
Credentials 
 
Attack Pattern ID: 21 
Abstraction: Standard 
 Status: Draft 
Completeness: Complete 
Description 
Summary 
Attacks on session IDs and resource IDs take advantage of the fact that some software accepts 
user input without verifying its authenticity. For example, a message queuing system that allows 
service requesters to post messages to its queue through an open channel (such as anonymous 
FTP), authorization is done through checking group or role membership contained in the posted 
message. However, there is no proof that the message itself, the information in the message 
(such group or role membership), or indeed the process that wrote the message to the queue are 
authentic and authorized to do so. 
Many server side processes are vulnerable to these attacks because the server to server 
communications have not been analyzed from a security perspective or the processes "trust" other 
systems because they are behind a firewall. In a similar way servers that use easy to guess or 
spoofable schemes for representing digital identity can also be vulnerable. Such systems 
frequently use schemes without cryptography and digital signatures (or with broken 
cryptography). Session IDs may be guessed due to insufficient randomness, poor protection 
(passed in the clear), lack of integrity (unsigned), or improperly correlation with access control 
policy enforcement points. 
Exposed configuration and properties files that contain system passwords, database connection 
strings, and such may also give an attacker an edge to identify these identifiers. 
The net result is that spoofing and impersonation is possible leading to an attacker's ability to 
break authentication, authorization, and audit controls on the system. 
25 
 
 
7. Knowledge Required: To achieve a direct connection with the weak or non-existent server 
session access control, and pose as an authorized user 
 
Listing 1.2 Snippet that may be Transferred Directly to the Abuse Case 
8. Crafting Abusive Interaction: Listing 1.3 the “Attack Execution Flow” part of “Description” 
is used for crafting the abusive interaction Abusive interaction is created from part of field of 
the attack pattern. The “Example Instance” field of an attack patterns with little “Attack 
Execution Flow” information may be inferred to craft the abusive interaction. Basically, any 
information the developer deems important should be included in the abusive interaction to 
build a strong case. 
 The “Attack Execution Flow” section typically comprises of “Explore”, “Experiment” 
and “Exploit” sections. The “Explore” section may be used for probing the application. The 
“Experiment” section might be used for finding out susceptibility to a certain input or query. The 
“Exploit” section is used for actually carrying an abuse on the system after the exploration and 
experimentation stages are successful. This is used for developing the abusive interaction section 
of the abuse case under consideration. 
Attack Prerequisites 
 Server software must rely on weak session IDs proof and/or verification schemes 
Typical Severity 
High 
Typical Likelihood of Exploit 
Likelihood: High 
Attacker Skills or Knowledge Required 
Skill or Knowledge Level: Low 
To achieve a direct connection with the weak or non-existent server session access control, and 
pose as an authorized user 
Resources Required 
Ability to deploy software on network. Ability to communicate synchronously or asynchronously 
with server 
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Listing 1.3 Information for Crafting Abusive Interaction section of Abuse Case 
Abusive Interaction. The attacker probes HIS (by spidering all available pages) for 
credentials, session tokens, or entry points that bypass credentials altogether and attacking 
known bad interfaces. The attacker then fetches many samples of session ids by: 1.) making 
many anonymous connections and recording the assigned session ids; 2.) making authorized 
connections and recording session tokens or credentials issued; 3.) An attacker gains access to 
Attack Execution Flow 
Explore 
1. Survey the application for Indicators of Susceptibility:  
Using a variety of methods, until one is found that applies to the target system. The attacker 
probes for credentials, session tokens, or entry points that bypass credentials altogether. 
Attack Step Techniques 
ID Attack Step Technique Description Environments 
1 Spider all available pages env-Web 
2 Attack known bad interfaces env-Web env-CommProtocol env-ClientServer env-
Local 
Experiment 
1. Fetch samples:  
An attacker fetches many samples of a session ID. This may be through legitimate access 
(logging in, legitimate connections, etc.) or just systematic probing. 
Attack Step Techniques 
ID Attack Step Technique Description Environments 
1 An attacker makes many anonymous connections and records the session 
IDs assigned. 
env-Web env-
Peer2Peer env-
CommProtocol env-
ClientServer 
2 An attacker makes authorized connections and records the session tokens 
or credentials issued. 
env-Web env-
Peer2Peer env-
CommProtocol env-
ClientServer 
3 An attacker gains access to (legitimately or illegitimately) a nearby system 
(e.g., in the same operations network, DMZ, or local network) and makes 
a connections from it, attempting to gain the same privileges as a trusted 
system. 
env-Peer2Peer env-
CommProtocol env-
ClientServer 
Exploit 
1. Impersonate:  
An attacker can use successful experiments to impersonate an authorized user or system 
2. Spoofing:  
Bad data can be injected into the system by an attacker. 
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(legitimately or illegitimately) a nearby system (e.g., in the same operations network, DMZ, or 
local network) and makes a connection from it, attempting to gain the same privileges as a 
trusted HIS system. 
 An attacker who succeeds in compromising the session keys can impersonate the doctor’s 
session and have the same capabilities as the doctor. There are two main ways for an attacker to 
exploit session IDs. 
1.) A brute force attack: involves an attacker repeatedly attempting to query the system with a 
spoofed session header in the HTTP request. HIS server might be easily spoofed if it uses a short 
session ID by trying many possible combinations so the parameters session-ID= 1234 has few 
possible combinations, and an attacker can retry several hundred or thousand request with little 
to no issue on their side. 
2.) Interception tools such as Wireshark is be used to sniff the wire and pull off any unprotected 
session identifiers. The attacker then use these variables to access the HIS application. 
9. Post Condition: Attacker successfully exploits session variables and assumes the identity of a 
doctor. 
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CHAPTER 4 
Developing Abuse Cases for a Hospital Information System 
 This chapter illustrates how attack patterns can be used to extend abuse cases for the 
Hospital Information System (HIS). Attack patterns contain much useful information for 
developing abuse cases. The extended abuse case includes the following information: objectives, 
prerequisites, resource required, typical severity, likelihood of exploit, attacker skills or 
knowledge required, abusive interaction and post condition. 
 To find out how useful a particular attack pattern is for extending the abuse cases, the 
following needs to be considered: 
1. The objective of the abuse case must correspond to the motivation of the attack pattern. 
2. The abuse cases prerequisites in the form of technology being implemented by the system 
must tally with the prerequisite required to successfully exploit the system using the attack 
pattern. 
3. The resource required might be any form of knowledge or resource an attacker might need or 
have to be able to exploit the system using the attack pattern. The harder it is for an attacker 
to find this resource, the harder it is to abuse the system using this attack pattern. 
4. The severity, likelihood of exploit, attacker skills are index properties used to check for 
granularity and trim down (by either combining them or removing duplicates altogether) the 
list of abuse cases when there seem to be too many attack patterns available for extending a 
single abuse case. 
5. Abusive interaction is the main description and steps required to attack the system. It gives 
information about how to explore the system for variables needed to exploit it and how to 
further exploit it when exploration is successful. The “Description” section of an attack 
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pattern should contain enough information to develop the abuse, if not, information  in the 
“Example Instance” section example could be utilized. 
 In addition to extending the already brainstormed abuse cases, new abuse cases might be 
discovered.  
 The following sections describe the process of developing abuse cases for the HIS. To 
keep the scope small, we develop abuse cases for only one use case “Enter Appointment 
Findings”. The process illustrated here starts from Step 3 in Figure 1.  
4.1 Using SDL Threat Modelling to Generate Keywords  for Selecting Attack Patterns 
 The SDL tool allows us to develop a data flow diagram (DFD) which is then analyzed for 
threats. The tool possesses a feature, “Certify that there are no threats of this type”, that allows 
users to consider if the threats exist in the system or not. To certify that the threat is not present, 
the user chooses a reason from a list whether the risk is within a trust boundary, mitigated 
elsewhere in the system or accepted. Table 3 summarizes the threats that pertain to each element 
and the keywords that were extracted from the questions generated by SDL to address the threat. 
Table 3 
Generated Keywords from Questions provided by SDL Tool for each Element and Threats 
Elements Threats Keywords 
Doctor 
Spoofing spoofing, credentials, key, cryptography, password, and 
authentication 
Repudiation repudiation, digital signature, timestamp, sequence, log 
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Table 3 
Cont. 
Data Flows 
Tampering Tamper, bits, dataflow, duplicate, overlap, authenticate, keys, 
validate, cryptographic, integrity 
Information 
Disclosure 
disclosure, information, authenticate, keys, validate, 
cryptographic 
Findings 
Process 
Spoofing spoofing, credentials, key, cryptography, password, and 
authentication 
Elevation of 
Privilege 
Elevation, privilege, alter, execution, code, validate, same 
origin, LinkDemand, .NET, verification 
Findings 
Data store 
Tampering tamper, alter, data, store, access, resources, datastore, wrap, 
discard 
Information 
Disclosure 
information, disclosure, access, data, encrypt, channel, 
recovery, storage 
 
4.2 Searching Attack Patterns using Keywords 
 TrAP is ran to categorize and rank attack patterns under STRIDE. Under each category, 
the keywords in Table 3 from section 4.1 above are input one after the other to search for 
relevant attack patterns. These attack patterns are most related to the threats which pertain to the 
system as suggested by the SDL tool. The attack patterns are copied in a table and a further 
selection is done to choose the ones to use for developing the abuse cases. Keywords may also 
include any technology implemented by the system and can be crafted by the developer to 
address the security need of the system. In our case, we only limit our keywords to the ones 
extracted from the questions generated by SDL. 
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 The attack patterns retrieved using keywords in table 3 are listed in the Appendix. The 
selected attack patterns for developing each abuse case are listed in table 4. 
Table 4 
Objective Mapping of Applicable Attack Patterns from List of Retrieved Attack Patterns to 
Elements and Threats. 
 
Elements Threats ID Attack Pattern 
Enter & 
Retrieve 
Findings 
Data Flows 
Information 
Disclosure 
& 
Tampering 
94 Man in the Middle Attack 
31 Accessing/Intercepting/Modifying HTTP Cookies 
Doctor Spoofing 
21 
Exploitation of Session Variables; Resource IDs and 
other Trusted Credentials 
49  Password Brute Forcing 
98 Phishing 
Findings 
Elevation of 
Privilege 
180 
Exploiting Incorrectly Configured Access Control 
Security Levels 
1 
Accessing Functionality Not Properly Constrained by 
ACLs 
Findings 
Data store 
Information 
Disclosure 
& 
Tampering 
66 SQL Injection 
139 Relative Path Traversal 
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4.3 Selecting Attack Patterns for Extending the Brainstormed Abuse Cases 
 Table 4 presents a fairly large list of attack patterns. Most of these attack patterns are 
related to each other with fewer variations. The keywords search retrieve attack patterns that may 
not be very useful in a particular situation, likewise, the keyword search might miss some attack 
patterns that are very vital for certain abuse cases. The search may also retrieve attack patterns 
that show little relevance in terms of information it entails. Manually going through the list of 
attack patterns retrieved by TrAP to select attack patterns is a best practice after keyword search 
has been completed. The manual searching process helps capture attack patterns missed by 
keyword search.  
 Table 5 maps elements to abuse cases to show elements that stand the highest chance of 
abuse. The findings process was excluded because it does not have a match with any of the abuse 
cases. Mapped attack patterns will be used to extend the abuse cases they are mapped to. 
Table 5 
Mapping Attack Patterns and Abuse Cases to Applicable Respective Elements 
 
Elements Abuse Case ID Attack Pattern 
Enter & Retrieve 
Findings Data Flows 
(E, R) 
Intercept 
and Analyze 
Data 
94 Man in the Middle Attack 
31 
Accessing/Intercepting/Modifying HTTP 
Cookies 
Doctor (D) 
Impersonate 
Doctor 
21 
Exploitation of Session Variables; Resource IDs 
and other Trusted Credentials 
49 Password Brute Forcing 
98 Phishing 
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Table 5 
Cont. 
 
4.4 Extending Abuse Cases with selected Attack Patterns 
 After the selection process, we extend our abuse cases using the selected attack patterns. 
Our abuse case is “Change Doctor’s Findings” and it includes two intermediary abuse cases: 
“Intercept and Analyze Packets” and “Impersonate Doctor”. To change the doctor’s findings, 
one has to be able to assume the role of the doctor. This can be done through either an external 
attacker spoofing the doctor or causing some level of elevation of privilege if they happen to be 
users of the HIS system. The attacker might need to intercept data packets on the wire and 
analyze them as an intermediate step to impersonate the doctor. Our assumption is that a 
successful impersonation will give the attacker enough privileges to change the doctor’s 
findings. 
 4.4.1 Extending “Intercept and Analyze Data” Abuse Case with the selected Attack 
Patterns. The main objective of this abuse varies from disclosing some secured information to 
tampering the information to perform further attack. For the purpose of this research, we assume 
that information within the trust boundary is secured from interception. In this case, data coming 
from the doctor such as credentials, can easily be captured for further analysis. This limits our 
threats scope to tampering and information disclosure threats. We will select attack patterns 
Findings – – – 
Findings Data store 
(FD) 
Change 
Doctor’s 
Findings 
66 SQL Injection 
139 Relative Path Traversal 
193 PHP Remote File Inclusion 
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relating to data flow from the doctor into the HIS system. Majority attack patterns inherently 
exploit the system to disclose sensitive information to assist in further attacks. 
 Information passing from doctor (client) to HIS server can be disclosed. Before 
tampering is done, there has to be some form of information disclosure. This information may be 
relevant for a later attack such as impersonating the doctor from captured credentials. 
Information disclosure of this nature is mostly a prerequisite for tampering and is always a sub 
motivation for tampering. 
 In reference to table 5, the most relevant attack patterns for tampering are: “CAPEC-94: 
Man in the Middle Attack” and “CAPEC-31: Accessing/Intercepting/Modifying HTTP Cookies”. 
These attack patterns would be used to extend the “Intercept and Analyze Packets” abuse case. 
As a result, two child abuse cases are generated (see figure 9): “Using Man-in-the-Middle to 
Intercept and Analyze Data” and “Intercept and Analyze HTTP Cookies”. 
4.4.1.1 Abuse Case: “Using Man-in-the-Middle Attack to Intercept and Analyze Data” 
Objectives. Attacker places himself in the communication channel between server and client to 
intercept and modify data passing from client to server and vice versa. 
Prerequisites: Server software must rely on weak session IDs proof and/or verification schemes 
Resource Required: None 
Typical Severity: High 
Likelihood of Exploit: High 
Attacker Skills or Knowledge Required: Level - Low 
Abusive Interaction: The attacker probes HIS to determine the nature and mechanism of 
communication between the client and server looking for opportunities to exploit. He then inserts 
himself into the communication channel initially acting as a routing proxy between the client and 
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the server. The attacker may or may not have to use cryptography. He observes, filters or alters 
passed data of its choosing to gain access to change the appointment findings coming from the 
doctor to the server. 
Post Condition: Attacker places himself between doctor and HIS server and changes 
appointment findings. 
Solutions and Mitigations: 
 HIS should use a public key signed by a certificate authority 
 HIS communication should be encrypted using cryptography (SSL) 
 HIS should Use strong mutual authentication to always fully authenticate both client and 
server.  
 HIS should exchange public keys using a secure channel 
4.4.1.2 Abuse Case: “Intercept and Analyze HTTP Cookies” 
Objectives: Intercept, modify and forward HTTP cookies to server to gain access to HIS. 
Prerequisites: Target server software must be a HTTP daemon that relies on cookies. 
Resource Required: Ability to send HTTP request containing cookie to server 
Typical Severity: High 
Likelihood of Exploit: High 
Attacker Skills or Knowledge Required:  
Skill Level 1: Low 
Knowledge Required 1: To overwrite session cookie data, and submit targeted attacks via HTTP 
Skill Level 2: High 
Knowledge Required 2: Exploiting a remote buffer overflow generated by attack 
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Abusive Interaction: The attacker first obtains a copy of the cookie. The attacker may be a 
legitimate end user wanting to escalate privilege, or could be somebody sniffing on a network to 
get a copy of HTTP cookies. 
Steps: 
1. Obtain cookie from local filesystem (e.g. C:\Documents and Settings\*\Cookies and 
C:\Documents and Settings\*\Application Data\Mozilla\Firefox\Profiles\*\cookies.txt in 
Windows) 
2. Sniff cookie using a network sniffer such as Wireshark 
3. Obtain cookie from local memory or filesystem using a utility such as the Firefox Cookie 
Manager or AnEC Cookie Editor. 
4. Steal cookie via a cross-site scripting attack. 
5. Guess cookie contents if it contains predictable information. 
 The attacker may be able to get doctor from the cookie. HIS assumes that cookies are not 
accessible by end users, and have potentially sensitive information in them. 
Steps: 
1. If cookie shows any signs of being encoded using a standard scheme such as base64, decode 
it. 
2. Analyze the cookie's contents to determine whether it contains any sensitive information. 
 The attacker may be able to modify or replace cookies to bypass security controls in the 
application. 
Steps: 
1. Modify logical parts of cookie and send it back to server to observe the effects. 
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2. Modify numeric parts of cookie arithmetically and send it back to server to observe the 
effects. 
3. Modify cookie bitwise and send it back to server to observe the effects. 
4. Replace cookie with an older legitimate cookie and send it back to server to observe the 
effects. This technique would be helpful in cases where the cookie contains a "points 
balance" for a given user where the points have some value. The user may spend his points 
and then replace his cookie with an older one to restore his balance. 
Post Condition: Attacker successfully subverts security controls on HIS server 
Solutions and Mitigations: 
 Design: Use input validation for cookies 
 Design: Generate and validate MAC (Message Authentication Code) for cookies 
 Implementation: Use SSL/TLS to protect cookie in transit 
 Implementation: Ensure HIS server implements all relevant security patches, many 
exploitable buffer overflows are fixed in patches issued for the software. 
 4.4.2 Extending “Impersonate Doctor” Abuse Case with the selected Attack 
Patterns. To impersonate the doctor, an attacker might spoof the login process. The main 
motivation of this attacker might be limited to assuming identity, however, he can further exploit 
the system by performing tampering, information disclosure, or denial of service attacks. 
In spoofing a doctor, the attacker is trying to assume the identity of a doctor. He does so by 
launching a number of attacks to first probe the system and then attack the authentication 
scheme. There are several attack patterns that can be used to build spoofing abuse cases to 
impersonate a valid user. We select three to extend the “Impersonate Doctor” abuse case: 
“CAPEC-21: Exploitation of Session Variables, Resource IDs and other Trusted Credentials”; 
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“CAPEC-49: Password Brute Forcing” and “CAPEC-98: Phishing”. As a result, the following 
child abuse cases were formed (see figure 9): “Spoof Doctor through Session Exploitation”, 
“Spoof Doctor through Password Brute Forcing”, and “Spoof Doctor through Phishing”. 
4.4.2.1 Abuse Case: “Spoof Doctor through Session Exploitation” 
Objectives: To impersonate the doctor and change appointment findings. 
Prerequisites: Server software must rely on weak session IDs proof and/or verification schemes 
Resource Required: Ability to deploy software on network. Ability to communicate 
synchronously or asynchronously with server.  
Typical Severity: High 
Likelihood of Exploit: High 
Attacker Skills Level: Low 
Knowledge Required: To achieve a direct connection with the weak or non-existent server 
session access control, and pose as an authorized user 
Abusive Interaction: The attacker probes HIS (by spidering all available pages) for credentials, 
session tokens, or entry points that bypass credentials altogether and attacking known bad 
interfaces. The attacker then fetches many samples of session ids by: 1.) making many 
anonymous connections and recording the assigned session ids; 2.) making authorized 
connections and recording session tokens or credentials issued; 3.) An attacker gains access 
(legitimately or illegitimately) to a nearby system (e.g., in the same operations network, DMZ, or 
local network) and makes a connection from it, attempting to gain the same privileges as a 
trusted HIS system. 
39 
 
 
 An attacker who succeeds in compromising the session keys can impersonate the doctor’s 
session and have the same capabilities as the doctor. There are two main ways for an attacker to 
exploit session IDs. 
1.) A brute force attack involves an attacker repeatedly attempting to query the system with a 
spoofed session header in the HTTP request. A web server that uses a short session ID can be 
easily spoofed by trying many possible combinations so the parameters session-ID= 1234 has 
few possible combinations, and an attacker can retry several hundred or thousand request with 
little to no issue on their side. 
2.) Interception tools such as Wireshark is be used to sniff the wire and pull off any unprotected 
session identifiers. The attacker then use these variables to access the HIS application. 
Post Condition: Attacker spoofs session ID and assumes doctor’s identity to change appointment 
findings.  
4.4.2.2 Abuse Case: “Spoof Doctor through Password Brute Forcing” 
Objectives: To impersonate an authorized the doctor 
Prerequisites:  
 An attacker needs to know the doctor’s username. 
 The system uses password based authentication as the one factor authentication mechanism. 
 An application does not have a password throttling mechanism in place. A good password 
throttling mechanism will make it almost impossible computationally to brute force a 
password as it may either lock out the user after a certain number of incorrect attempts or 
introduce time out periods. Both of these would make a brute force attack impractical. 
Resource Required: A powerful enough computer for the job with sufficient CPU, RAM and 
HD. Exact requirements will depend on the size of the brute force job and the time requirement 
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for completion. Some brute forcing jobs may require grid or distributed computing (e.g. DES 
Challenge). 
Typical Severity: High 
Likelihood of Exploit: Medium 
Skills Level: Low 
Knowledge Required: A brute force attack is very straightforward. A variety of password 
cracking tools are widely available. 
Abusive Interaction: The attacker tries to determine the password policies of HIS by 
determining: 1.) the minimum and maximum password lengths allowed; 2.) the formats of 
allowed passwords (whether they are allowed or required to contain special characters or 
numbers); 3.) Account lockout policy (a strict account lockout policy will prevent brute force 
attacks). Given the finite space of possible passwords dictated by the password policy 
determined in the previous step, the attacker tries all possible passwords for a known doctor’s 
user ID until application/system grants access by: 1.) Manually or automatically entering all 
possible passwords through HIS's interface. Start with the shortest and simplest possible 
passwords, because if allowed to do so, most users tend to select such passwords; 2.) Performing 
an offline dictionary attack or a rainbow table attack against a known password hash. 
Post Condition: Attacker determines correct password for a doctor’s user ID and obtains access 
to the HIS system. 
4.4.2.3 Abuse Case: “Spoof Doctor through Phishing” 
Objectives: Attacker (https://www.Heatlh.com) masquerades as HIS (https://www.Health.com) 
and does business with doctor, gathers credentials and then logs in as the doctor. 
Prerequisites:  
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 An attacker needs to have a way to initiate contact with the victim. Typically that will happen 
through e-mail. 
 An attacker needs to correctly guess the entity (HIS) with which the doctor does business and 
impersonate it.  
 An attacker needs to have a sufficiently compelling call to action to prompt the doctor to take 
action. 
 The replicated website needs to look extremely similar to the original HIS website and the 
URL used to get to that website needs to look like the real URL of the HIS system. 
Resource Required: Some web development tools to put up a fake website. 
Typical Severity: Very High 
Likelihood of Exploit: High 
Attacker Skills: Medium 
Abusive Interaction: An attacker creates https://www.Heatlh.com which resembles 
https://www.Health.com, the HIS website that he is trying to impersonate. The attacker’s website 
has a login form for the victim to put in his authentication credentials. 
Steps: 
1. Attacker spiders http://www.Health.com to get copies of web pages. 
2. He manually saves copies of required web pages from Health.com. 
3. Attacker then creates new web pages that have the https://www.Health.com’s look and feel, 
but contain completely new content. 
 The attacker sends an e-mail to the doctor about a possible login abuse action against HIS 
website (https://www.Health.com) by placing the link https://Heatlh.com/suspicious_activity.php 
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in the email. Once the doctor clicks on the link included in the e-mail pointing to the attacker’s 
website, he is required to change his password and his credentials are compromised. 
Steps: 
1. Send the doctor a message from a spoofed legitimate-looking e-mail address that asks him to 
click on the included link. 
2. Place phishing link in post to online forum. 
Post Condition: Once the attacker captures these login credentials through phishing, he can 
leverage this information by logging into HIS to change the doctor’s appointment findings. 
 4.4.3 Extending “Change Doctor’s Findings” Abuse Case with the selected Attack 
Patterns. “Impersonate Doctor” and “Intercept and Analyze Data” are sub-abuse cases of 
“Change Doctor’s Findings” abuse case. The main motivation of the attacker to manipulate the 
findings might first be to gain privileges as doctor or to disclose information, analyze the bits and 
tamper it. 
 To tamper with the doctor’s findings, an attacker might try to directly get access to the 
file that the findings data are saved in and then change them. Tampering affects the integrity of 
the data through forgery. The attack patterns: “CAPEC-66: SQL Injection”; “CAPEC-139: 
Relative Path Traversal” and “CAPEC-193: Remote File Inclusion” are selected for extending 
the “Change Doctor’s Findings” abuse case. As a result, three child abuse cases are formed (see 
figure 9): “Change Findings Using SQL Injection”, “Change Findings through Path Traversal” 
and “Change Findings through File Inclusion”. 
4.4.3.1 Abuse Case: “Change Findings Using SQL Injection” 
Objectives: To bypass the application completely to talk directly to the database, causing 
information disclosure and granting ability to modify data in the findings database. 
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Prerequisites:  
 SQL queries used by HIS application to store, retrieve or modify data. 
 User-controllable input that is not properly validated by the HIS application as part of SQL 
queries. 
Typical Severity: High 
Likelihood of Exploit: Very High 
Skill Level: Low 
Knowledge Required: It is fairly simple for someone with basic SQL knowledge to perform SQL 
injection, in general. In certain instances, however, specific knowledge of the database employed 
may be required. 
Abusive Interaction: First take an inventory of the functionality exposed by HIS. 
Steps: 
1. Spider HIS web sites for all available links 
2. Sniff network communications with HIS application using a utility such as Wireshark. 
Determine the user-controllable input susceptible to injection. For each user-controllable input 
suspected to be vulnerable to SQL injection, attempt to inject characters that have special 
meaning in SQL (such as a single quote character, a double quote character, two hyphens, a 
parenthesis, etc.). The goal is to create a SQL query with an invalid syntax. 
Steps: 
1. Use web browser to inject input through text fields or through HTTP GET parameters. 
2. Use a web application debugging tool such as Tamper Data, TamperIE, WebScarab,etc. to 
modify HTTP POST parameters, hidden fields, non-freeform fields, etc. 
3. Use network-level packet injection tools such as netcat to inject input  
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4. Use modified client (modified by reverse engineering) to inject input. 
 After determining that a given input is vulnerable to SQL Injection, hypothesize what the 
underlying query looks like. Iteratively try to add logic to the query to extract and modify 
information in the findings database. 
Steps: 
1. Use public resources such as "SQL Injection Cheat Sheet" at 
http://ferruh.mavituna.com/makale/sql-injection-cheatsheet/, and try different approaches for 
adding logic to SQL queries. 
2. Add logic to query, and use detailed error messages from the server to debug the query. For 
example, if adding a single quote to a query causes an error message, try : "' OR 1=1; --", or 
something else that would syntactically complete a hypothesized query. Iteratively refine the 
query. 
3. Use "Blind SQL Injection" techniques to extract information about the database schema. 
Post Condition: Attacker achieves goal of unauthorized system access to change doctor’s 
appointment findings. 
Solutions and Mitigations: 
 Strong input validation - All user-controllable input must be validated and filtered for illegal 
characters as well as SQL content. Keywords such as UNION, SELECT or INSERT must be 
filtered in addition to characters such as a single-quote (') or SQL-comments (--) based on the 
context in which they appear. 
 Use of parameterized queries or stored procedures - Parameterization causes the input to be 
restricted to certain domains, such as strings or integers, and any input outside such domains 
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is considered invalid and the query fails. Note that SQL Injection is possible even in the 
presence of stored procedures if the eventual query is constructed dynamically. 
 Use of custom error pages - Attackers can glean information about the nature of queries from 
descriptive error messages. Input validation must be coupled with customized error pages 
that inform about an error without disclosing information about the database or application. 
4.4.3.2 Abuse Case: “Change Findings through Path Traversal” 
Objectives: An attacker bypasses input validation on HIS by supplying a specially constructed 
path utilizing dot and slash characters for the purpose of obtaining access to findings database 
file and changing doctor’s findings. 
Prerequisites: The HIS application must accept a string as user input, fail to sanitize 
combinations of characters in the input that have a special meaning in the context of path 
navigation, and insert the user-supplied string into path navigation commands. 
Typical Severity: High 
Likelihood of Exploit: High 
Attacker Skills or Knowledge Required: 
Skill Level 1: Low 
Knowledge Required 1: To inject the malicious payload in a web page 
Skill Level 2:  High 
Knowledge Required 2: To bypass non trivial filters in the application 
Resources Required: None 
Abusive Interaction: Using a browser or an automated tool, follow all public links on HIS web 
site, record all the links found and pick out the URL parameters that may related to access to 
files. 
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Steps: 
1. Use a spidering tool to follow and record all links. Make special note of any links that 
include parameters in the URL. 
2. Use a proxy tool to record all links visited during a manual traversal of the web application. 
Make special note of any links that include parameters in the URL. Manual traversal of this 
type is frequently necessary to identify forms that are GET method forms rather than POST 
forms. 
3. Use a browser to manually explore the website and analyze how it is constructed. Many 
browsers plug-ins are available to facilitate the analysis or automate the URL discovery. 
 Possibly using an automated tool, request variations on the identified inputs and send 
parameters that include variations of payloads. 
Steps: 
1. Use a list of probe strings as path traversal payload. Different strings may be used for 
different platforms. Strings contain relative path sequences such as "../".  
2. Use a proxy tool to record results of manual input of relative path traversal probes in known 
URLs. 
 Inject path traversal syntax into identified vulnerable inputs to cause inappropriate 
reading, writing or execution of findings data file. A successful attack allows reading HIS 
directories or files which we would not normally be allowed to read. The attacker could also 
access data outside the web document root, or include scripts, source code and other kinds of 
files from external websites. Once there is access to the findings data file, the doctor findings is 
modified. 
Steps: 
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1. Manipulate findings data file and its path by injecting relative path sequences (e.g. "../"). 
2. Download findings data file, and modify the file 
Post Condition: The attacker accesses the content findings data store and modifies the doctor’s 
appointment findings. 
Solutions and Mitigations: 
 Design: Input validation. Assume that user inputs are malicious. Utilize strict type, character, 
and encoding enforcement 
 Implementation: Perform input validation for all remote content, including remote and user-
generated content. 
 Implementation: Validate user input by only accepting known good. Ensure all content that is 
delivered to client is sanitized against an acceptable content specification -- whitelisting 
approach. 
 Implementation: Prefer working without user input when using file system calls 
 Implementation: Use indirect references rather than actual file names. 
 Implementation: Use possible permissions on file access when developing and deploying 
web applications. 
4.4.3.3 Abuse Case: “Change Findings through File Inclusion” 
Objectives: To control an improperly sanitized "include" or "require" call through an insecurely 
configured PHP runtime environment to point to findings data store file to load and execute 
arbitrary code remotely available from HIS to change doctor’s findings. 
Prerequisites: HIS application server must allow remote files to be included in the "require", 
"include", etc. PHP directives 
Typical Severity: High 
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Likelihood of Exploit: High 
Attacker Skills or Knowledge Required: 
Skill Level 1: Low 
Knowledge Required 1: To inject the malicious payload in a web page 
Skill Level 2:  Medium 
Knowledge Required 2: To bypass filters in the application 
Resources Required: Ability to send HTTP request to a web application. Ability to store PHP 
scripts on a server 
Abusive Interaction: Using a browser or an automated tool, an attacker follows all public links 
on HIS web site. He records all the links he finds. 
Steps: 
1. Use a spidering tool to follow and record all links. Make special note of any links that 
include parameters in the URL. 
2. Use a proxy tool to record all links visited during a manual traversal of the web application. 
Make special note of any links that include parameters in the URL. Manual traversal of this 
type is frequently necessary to identify forms that are GET method forms rather than POST 
forms. 
3. Use a browser to manually explore the website and analyze how it is constructed. Many 
browser's plugins are available to facilitate the analysis or automate the URL discovery. 
 The attack variants make use of a remotely available PHP script that generates a uniquely 
identifiable output when executed on the target application server. Possibly using an automated 
tool, request variations on the inputs surveyed before. Send parameters that include variations of 
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payloads which include a reference to the remote PHP script. Record all the responses from the 
server that include the output of the execution of remote PHP script. 
Steps: 
1. Use a list of probe strings to inject in parameters of known URLs. The probe strings are 
variants of PHP remote file inclusion payloads which include a reference to the attackers' 
controlled remote PHP script. 
2. Use a proxy tool to record results of manual input of remote file inclusion probes in known 
URLs. 
 Success in exploiting the vulnerability, enables execution of server-side code within the 
application. The malicious code has virtual access to the same resources as the HIS application. 
If required, include shell code in the script to execute commands on the server under the same 
privileges as the PHP runtime is running with. 
Steps: 
1. Malicious PHP script that is injected through vectors identified during previous phase and 
executed by the application server to execute a custom PHP script. 
Post Condition: The attacker's script is executed on the HIS server. 
Solutions and Mitigations: 
 Implementation: Perform input validation for all remote content, including remote and user-
generated content 
 Implementation: Only allow known files to be included (whitelist) 
 Implementation: Make use of indirect references passed in URL parameters instead of file 
names 
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 Configuration: Ensure that remote scripts cannot be include in the "include" or "require" PHP 
directives 
 Figure 9 provides an overview of all the child abuse cases generated through extending 
the initial brainstormed abuse cases.  
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Figure 9. Child Abuse Cases revealed after Extending Brainstormed Ones 
4.5 Finding New Abuse Cases 
 Figure 9 shows abuse cases revealed after extending the brainstormed ones. After 
extending the abuse cases, we discovered new abuse cases, namely: “Repudiate Doctor”, 
“Impersonate Findings Process” and “Enter Appointment Findings as Nurse”. 
 SDL analysis shows us that a doctor can be impersonated and/or repudiated against. The 
abuse case “Repudiate Doctor” is when another doctor is able to enter or change appointment 
findings s another doctor and totally deny doing so. “Impersonate Findings Process” allows an 
attacker to place himself as a trusted findings process of HIS. He then collects all appointment 
findings coming from doctor, modifies it and forwards it to the HIS server. A nurse has the role 
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to enter preliminary appointment information in HIS (Pauli & Xu, 2005). In the abuse case 
“Enter Appointment Findings as Nurse”, the attacker elevates the privileges of the nurse’s 
process by bypassing the ACL’s confining the findings process to only the doctor users of HIS. 
If there are ACL’s protecting various elements or the mechanism is weak, the attacker leverages 
the vulnerability to perform this attack. 
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Figure 10. New Abuse Cases Discovered 
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CHAPTER 5 
Conclusion and Future Research 
 Attack patterns are gaining attention in both research and usage in the secure software 
development field. This research provides an approach for utilizing CAPEC attack patterns for 
developing abuse cases. The most useful attack patterns are the most informative and relevant for 
the system under development. It is not an easy exercise however, to find relevant attack patterns 
from the CAPEC library which might be useful enough for developing abuse cases. A Tool for 
Retrieving Attack Patterns (TrAP) was developed to make it easier to retrieve relevant attack 
patterns from CAPEC library.  
 An abuse case developer should be able to think about rigorous actions against the 
software under development. We proposed a systematic method to use relevant CAPEC attack 
patterns for developing abuse cases. 
 This method utilizes attack patterns to develop abuse cases using Microsoft SDL threat 
modelling to aid the selection of most relevant attack patterns. The methodology follows the 
following process: 1.) develop use and abuse cases form software architecture documentation; 2.) 
decompose the software into elements and run SDL threat modelling analysis to model threats in 
the various elements; 3.) extract keywords from questions generated for STRIDE threat types by 
SDL tool; 4.) use keywords to search for attack patterns in the TrAP tool based on STRIDE 
threat types; 5.) select relevant attack patterns from the search results and extend abuse cases 
using information contained in the attack patterns. 
 After searching for the attack patterns, the list should be checked ensure solid abuse cases 
are built from the most relevant attack patterns retrieved. Key word search might retrieve related 
attack patterns or patterns that are related to each other, but might have motivations that vary 
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slightly form the objectives of the abuse case. This following process should be followed to 
select relevant attack patterns: 1.) compares the attack motivation of the attack patterns to the 
objective of the abuse case to make sure they match; 2.) checks for special technology 
implemented in the software against the attack prerequisites of the attack patterns to make sure 
attack prerequisites are not obsolete; 3.) checks the resources required by the attack pattern to 
view its viability to be practical enough for developing abuse cases; 4.) checks the attacker skills 
needed to exploit the software to see the level of skill and knowledge might be required to 
exploit software using the pattern; 5.) checks likelihood of exploit and severity of attack to find 
out how the attack pattern is suited for building a well-grounded abuse case for the software 
being developed. 
 The challenges developers might face adopting this methodology is generating keywords 
for searching attack patterns. Since the same questions might be asked for the same threat 
pertaining to various elements, this might present a limitation of use of the retrieved/selected 
attack patterns. To subvert this challenge however, developers should scan through the list of 
retrieved attack patterns to manually search for relevant attack patterns by STRIDE threat type. 
The manually searched attack patterns should be combined with the ones searched using the 
keywords to remove duplicates. Attack patterns should then be selected from the combined list to 
develop the abuse cases.  Also, in the case where many similar attack patterns can be used for 
developing the same abuse case, deciding between combing information from one or more attack 
patterns or choosing an attack pattern over the other might pose as a difficult challenge. Users 
should be familiar with CAPEC attack patterns and Microsoft SDL in order to apply this 
methodology successfully.   
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 Our future work will focus on using attack patterns for architectural risk analysis, design, 
and developing test cases. 
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Appendix 
List of attack patterns retrieved under Spoofing threat using keyword search in TrAP. 
CAPEC 
ID Attack Pattern Name 
21 Exploitation of Session Variables; Resource IDs and other Trusted Credentials 
60 Reusing Session IDs (aka Session Replay) 
59 Session Credential Falsification through Prediction 
37 Lifting Data Embedded in Client Distributions 
196 Session Credential Falsification through Forging 
98 Phishing 
107 Cross Site Tracing 
57 Utilizing REST's Trust in the System Resource to Register Man in the Middle 
205 Lifting credential(s)/key material embedded in client distributions (thick or thin) 
90 Reflection Attack in Authentication Protocol 
70 Try Common(default) Usernames and Passwords 
199 Cross-Site Scripting Using Alternate Syntax 
69 Target Programs with Elevated Privileges 
68 Subvert Code-signing Facilities 
97 Cryptanalysis 
112 Brute Force 
49 Password Brute Forcing 
55 Rainbow Table Password Cracking 
16 Dictionary-based Password Attack 
59 
 
 
List of attack patterns retrieved under Spoofing threat using keyword search in TrAP. 
Cont. 
50 Password Recovery Exploitation 
57 Utilizing REST's Trust in the System Resource to Register Man in the Middle 
114 Authentication Abuse 
11 Cause Web Server Misclassification 
136 LDAP Injection 
83 XPath Injection 
39 Manipulating Opaque Client-based Data Tokens 
22 Exploiting Trust in Client (aka Make the Client Invisible) 
207 Removing Important Functionality from the Client 
5 Analog In-band Switching Signals (aka Blue Boxing) 
 
List of attack patterns retrieved under Elevation of Privilege threat using keyword search in 
TrAP. 
CAPEC 
ID 
Attack Pattern Name 
66 SQL Injection 
84 XQuery Injection 
275 DNS Rebinding 
180 Exploiting Incorrectly Configured Access Control Security Levels 
77 Manipulating User-Controlled Variables 
110 SQL Injection through SOAP Parameter Tampering 
1 Accessing Functionality Not Properly Constrained by ACLs 
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List of attack patterns retrieved under Elevation of Privilege threat using keyword search in 
TrAP. 
Cont. 
10 Buffer Overflow via Environment Variables 
104 Cross Zone Scripting 
86 Embedding Script (XSS ) in HTTP Headers 
135 Format String Injection 
6 Argument Injection 
107 Cross Site Tracing 
4 Using Alternative IP Address Encodings 
34 HTTP Response Splitting 
92 Forced Integer Overflow 
57 Utilizing REST's Trust in the System Resource to Register Man in the Middle 
21 Exploitation of Session Variables; Resource IDs and other Trusted Credentials 
163 Spear Phishing 
35 Leverage Executable Code in Nonexecutable Files 
22 Exploiting Trust in Client (aka Make the Client Invisible) 
62 Cross Site Request Forgery (aka Session Riding) 
23 File System Function Injection; Content Based 
237 Calling Signed Code From Another Language Within A Sandbox Allow This 
207 Removing Important Functionality from the Client 
65 Passively Sniff and Capture Application Code Bound for Authorized Client 
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List of attack patterns retrieved under Elevation of Privilege threat using keyword search in 
TrAP. 
Cont. 
259 Passively Sniffing and Capturing Application Code Bound for an Authorized Client 
During Patching 
187 Malicious Automated Software Update 
177 Create files with the same name as files protected with a higher classification 
256 Resource Manipulation 
122 Exploitation of Authorization 
 
List of attack patterns retrieved under Information Disclosure and Tampering threats using 
keyword search in TrAP. 
CAPEC 
ID Attack Pattern Name 
66 SQL Injection 
275 DNS Rebinding 
51 Poison Web Service Registry 
136 LDAP Injection 
267 Leverage Alternate Encoding 
110 SQL Injection through SOAP Parameter Tampering 
87 Forceful Browsing 
31 Accessing/Intercepting/Modifying HTTP Cookies 
21 Exploitation of Session Variables; Resource IDs and other Trusted Credentials 
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List of attack patterns retrieved under Information Disclosure and Tampering threats using 
keyword search in TrAP. 
Cont. 
7 Blind SQL Injection 
37 Lifting Data Embedded in Client Distributions 
83 XPath Injection 
86 Embedding Script (XSS ) in HTTP Headers 
6 Argument Injection 
101 Server Side Include (SSI) Injection 
163 Spear Phishing 
196 Session Credential Falsification through Forging 
98 Phishing 
222 iFrame Overlay 
219 XML Routing Detour Attacks 
107 Cross Site Tracing 
58 Restful Privilege Elevation 
91 XSS in IMG Tags 
132 Symlink Attack 
205 Lifting credential(s)/key material embedded in client distributions (thick or thin) 
48 Passing Local Filenames to Functions That Expect a URL 
95 WSDL Scanning 
12 Choosing a Message/Channel Identifier on a Public/Multicast Channel 
11 Cause Web Server Misclassification 
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List of attack patterns retrieved under Information Disclosure and Tampering threats using 
keyword search in TrAP. 
Cont. 
111 JSON Hijacking (aka JavaScript Hijacking) 
65 Passively Sniff and Capture Application Code Bound for Authorized Client 
259 
Passively Sniffing and Capturing Application Code Bound for an Authorized Client 
During Patching 
18 Embedding Scripts in Nonscript Elements 
170 Web Server/Application Fingerprinting 
215 Fuzzing and observing application log data/errors for application mapping 
169 Footprinting 
121 Locate and Exploit Test APIs 
112 Brute Force 
 
